Organisational status, ownership and productivity. by Parker, David
SWP 37/90 ORGANISATIONAL STATUS, OWNERSHIP 
AND PRODUCTIVITY 
DAVID PARKER 
Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfieid 
Bedford MK43 OAL 
UK 
(Tel: 0234 - 751122) 
KEITH HARTLEY and STEPHEN MARTIN 
Institute for Social and Economic Research 
University of York 
York 
UK 
Copyright: Hartley, Parker and Martin, 1990 
ORGANISATIONAL, STATUS, OWNERSHIP AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Keith Hartley(l) 
David Parkert2) 
and 
Stephen Martin(') 
(l)Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
University of York 
(2)Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 
February, 1990 
1. Introduction 
In recent years Government economic policy in the UK and 
elsewhere has been guided by the belief that changing organisational 
status improves performance (Hemming and Mansoor, 1988). This is 
most evident in the case of the UK privatisation programme. By 
late 1989, 64 organisations had been privatised involving the sale 
of over f26 bn of public sector assets to the private sector. One 
major reason for privatisation is the belief that resources are 
more efficiently used in the private sector. It has been claimed 
that 11 . . . privatisation involves more than the simple transfer of 
ownership. It involves the transfer and redefinition of a complex 
bundle of property rights which creates a whole new penalty-reward 
system which will alter the incentives in the firm and 
ultimately its performance" (Veljanovski, 1987, pp 77-8). In the 
Conservative party's 1987 Election Manifesto reference was made to 
productivity soaring in the newly-privatised companies. 
The privatisation programme in the UK, however, is now attracting 
critical comment. One review concluded that the Government's desire 
to sell the industries quickly and raise revenue from asset sales to 
balance the government budget, alongside other goals such as widening 
share ownership, has meant that: "The outcome is that no 
objectives are effectively attained, and in particular that of 
economic efficiency - which is at once the most important of these 
and the most difficult to obtain - has systematically been 
subordinated to other goals" (Kay and Thompson, 1986, p.61). The 
attention of economists has begun to focus on the role of competition 
in the product market rather than ownership per se. The importance 
of competition over ownership in determining efficiency is 
highlighted in empirical studies of public vs private efficiency 
(Millward and Parker 1983). Also, we have been reminded that: 
"Selling a government firm makes no difference to the competitive 
environment in which it operates; ownership and competitive structure 
are separate issues." (Forsyth, 1984 p.61). Nevertheless, the British 
Government continues to hold firmly to the belief that changing 
organisational status leads to improved performance. To complement 
its extensive privatisation programme, early in 1988 it announced the 
introduction of a major overhaul of the civil service as recommended 
by the Government's efficiency adviser (Sir Robin Ibbs, 1988). This 
involves the establishment of a number of agencies in place of direct 
departmental control. Amongst the first to be earmarked were the 
Department of Transport vehicle inspectorate, the Companies 
Registration Office, the Employment Service and the defence non- 
nuclear research establishments. Agencies are designed to obtain 
better value for money by developing greater managerial responsibility 
and increasing commercial independence. If completed the reform will 
transfer around 450,000 of the 600,000 strong civil service into 
governmental agencies. 
The idea that public sector organisations working to some degree 
at "arm's length" from government outperform government departments 
is not new. In the post-war period public corporations (including 
nationalised industries), various "guangos" and trading funds were 
established in the UK. However, the record of public corporations 
is now considered disappointing (Pryke, 1981) and "guangos" have been 
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Fallon, 1978). Clearly there is a need to investigate the counter 
claims surrounding organisational status and performance. 
This paper studies the performance of ten UK organisations 
which have been subject to one or more changes in status. These 
embrace changes within the public sector involving government 
departments, trading funds and public corporations, as well as changes 
in ownership between the public and private sectors. Performance is 
assessed in terms of production efficiency reflected in changes in 
the rate of growth in both labour and total factor productivity. 
Other performance measures based upon employment functions and 
standard accounting ratios are reported elsewhere (Hartley and 
Parker, 1990). In section 2 of the paper a model of status change 
and performance is developed for testing and the organisations 
studied are reviewed. Section 3 details the performance measures 
used and reports the results. Section 4 reconciles our results with 
national trends in productivity. Changes in performance over time 
may merely reflect movements in national productivity resulting from 
macroeconomic policy and political changes (e.g. the 'Thatcher 
factor'). In section 5, alongside conclusions, the consequences of 
our findings for policy and future research are briefly considered. 
2. Modellinq status chanse 
This study investigates the effects of both changes in 
organisational status within the public sector and between the 
public and private sectors. Since the relevant analytical 
framework has been presented elsewhere (Dunsire, et al, 1988) it is 
outlined only briefly here. In Figure 1, on the west to east axis 
are positioned certain organisational forms intended to represent 
the main types of organisations in the public and private sectors - 
government department, quasi-governmental agencies (eg trading 
funds), public corporations, hybrids, private sector plcs (public 
limited companies) and owner-managed firms. These are broad 
categories but further subdivision is unnecessary for our analysis. 
(Figure 1 Here) 
In the far west in Figure 1 lies the government department. Its 
main feature is direct political control of services which critics, 
including public choice theorists, argue leads to short-term political 
goals, damaging political intervention in decision-making and 
bureaucratic self-seeking (Mitchell 1988). The next category is 
non-governmental agencies, which have some degree of autonomy from 
government. A number of UK trading funds were established under the 
1973 Government Trading Funds Act. They remain responsible to a 
government minister bout are expected to finance their operations 
commercially by charging for goods and services instead of being 
dependent, like government departments, on annual Parliamentary 
votes and appropriations. Non-governmental agencies were set up to 
reduce political intervention and to encourage a more commercial and 
cost efficient use of resources. Similarly, public corporations were 
established to operate even more at "arm's length" from government: a 
constitutional arrangement which was intended to combine efficient 
management with accountability (Morrison, 1933). Our hypothesis, 
therefore, in terms of Figure 1 is that a movement eastward 
within the public sector raises efficiency: hence a trading fund is 
expected to be more efficient than a government department and a 
public corporation is deemed to be superior to a trading fund. 
Turning to the private sector, in the far east in Figure 1 lies 
the sole proprietor business where property rights are unattenuated, 
implying maximum incentives to achieve profit by operating 
efficiently. Under this broad heading we can also include 
private companies and partnerships where there is a negligible 
principal and agent problem. Moving west, the next category is the 
public joint stock company where ownership and control are divorced 
but the existence of a competitive capital market, and especially 
the threat of takeover, may constrain managerial discretionary 
(non-profit) behaviour. Finally, at the interface between the 
private and public sectors is a hybrid grouping which, as the 
name suggests, includes those organisations which do not neatly fit 
into the other categories. Examples include not-for-profit 
organisations such as charities, clubs, churches and mutuals; and 
private sector companies heavily dependent upon public sector orders 
or financing. Government contracts of the "cost-plus" type may 
dull incentives to be efficient (Hartley 1987). Although we are 
not concerned with testing the effects of changes in organisational 
status within the private sector, our scheme suggests that 
organisational changes will have their most profound effect on 
performance the further the distance on the west to east axis 
organisations move. 
In addition to formal organisational status, another possible 
factor determining performance is competition in the product 
market. Indeed, critics of current UK policy have stressed the role 
of competition. Market structure is important since a firm in a 
highly competitive product market is unable to sell goods and 
services above the prices set by competitors and survive. This is 
vividly illustrated by the economist's model of perfect competition; 
though lesser forms of competition may produce similar inducements 
to be efficient. By contrast those firms operating in markets 
where competition is restricted may take on characteristics 
associated with the economist's models of oligopoly or monopoly. 
A firm may be inefficient and able to remain in business if the 
market is neither contested nor contestable. 
In practice, certain government departments, agencies and corpo- 
rations hold monopoly rights over the provision of goods and 
services, which is expected to reduce both allocative and 
productive efficiency. Suggestion that government departments and 
agencies should compete to raise efficiency has met with only a 
limited response in the UK, where policy has concentrated instead 
upon privatisation. Of course, some public sector activities 
have operated in competitive markets (e.g. shipbuilding). 
In Figure 1 movement down the north-south axis represents an 
increase in the degree of competition, with monopoly and perfect 
competition identified as extremes. Thus in Figure 1 the per- 
formance of organisations is determined by their organisational 
status and the product market in which they operate. The change in 
an organisation's position within the ABXY space can now be plotted 
and hypotheses regarding performance changes established. - Our 
central hvoothesis is that an organisation "improves" its 
performance as its status is changed on a west to east and/or 
north to south spectrum. Movements south to north or east to west 
.are expected to be associated with a decline in efficiency. The 
effect on efficiency of north-south and east-west or south-north and 
west-east movements is more difficult to predict since the changes 
in the product market and organisational status appear to have 
opposing effects upon efficiency. 
The organisations selected for study are the Post Office postal 
and telecommunications services, London Transport, the National 
Freight Corporation (later Consortium), British Airways, the 
Royal Mint, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Rolls Royce, the 
Royal Ordnance Factories and British Aerospace. This sample 
includes all the relevant movements within the public sector and 
between the public and private sectors as set out in Figure 1. 
British Airways was not privatised until January 1987 but is 
included to test for "anticipation effects". Its privatisation was 
announced by government as early as 1980 though delayed by a 
recession in air transport and legal difficulties following the 
collapse of Laker Airways. Nevertheless we would expect to see 
changes in managerial behaviour reflected in changes in productivity 
in the run-up to privatisation. Casual observation suggests 
that privatisation in the UK has been preceded by important 
reorganisations aimed at making the firms involved more 
commercially orientated. 
(Table 1 around here) 
out in Table 1 where there is also a brief comment on the nature 
of the product market. In most cases, the change in status was not 
associated with any significant change in product market 
competition. Thus any improvement or deterioration in performance 
appears not to be related to a north-south or south-north movement 
and can therefore be attributed to the change in organisational 
status. There are three major exceptions. In the 1980's London 
Transport faced increased competition from other bus companies and 
modes of transport, losing some of its monopoly of public transport 
in London. Similarly, following the HMSO's establishment as a 
trading fund in 1980, government procurement of stationery was 
opened up to more private competition. The third case involves 
British Aerospace. On nationalisation in 1977 British Aerospace 
was created by the merger of three airframe manufacturers, namely, 
Hawker Siddley Ltd, the British Aircraft Corporation (Holdings) Ltd 
and Scottish Aviation Ltd. In these three cases efficiency 
changes could reflect both the effect of a change in organisational 
status and an alteration in the market environment. 
3. The Performance measures and empirical results 
Testing hypotheses relating organisational status to performance 
is not without its problems. Allowance has to be made for what 
would have happened without the change; for the possibility that a 
transfer of ownership leads to the pursuit of different objectives; 
for anticipation effects whereby performance might improve prior 
to a status change; and for the possibility of substantial lags 
in improved performance following the change. Indeed the 
possibility of both anticipation and lag effects raises doubts 
about relying on the publicly-announced date of the status change, 
Finally, and ideally, a model is required which holds constant all 
other relevant variables, so isolating any contribution of status 
change to improved performance. For example, in the 197Os, UK 
labour productivity grew slowly, whereas between 1979 and 1987 it 
rose substantially. Changes in performance during these years by 
firms in our sample may merely reflect national trends. In this 
paper the counter-factual is represented by trends in labour 
productivity and total factor productivity for the UK economy, 
public corporations and manufacturing. 
So far the term "efficiency" has been used but not defined. This 
study is concerned with '*production" efficiency as reflected by 
changes in labour and total factor productivity before and after the 
relevant organisational changes. Both productivity measures have been 
widely used as indicators of economic performance. For example, the 
National Economic Development Office (1976), Pryke (1981) and Molyneux 
and Thompson (1987) have used both measures to determine how 
efficiently some of the UK's nationalised industries have performed 
throughout the last three decades. It is, however, recognised that 
there are further performance measures such as profitability, various 
financial ratios, market shares, technical progress and consumer 
satisfaction (e.g. number of complaints: Smith and Mayston, 1987). 
The rationale behind an examination of the behaviour of an organ- 
isation's productivity is to determine the relationship between 
changes in the volume of outputs and changes in the volume of inputs 
(holding constant the quality of both inputs and outputs). If the 
volume of output changes more rapidly than the volume of inputs then 
the organisation‘s productivity can be said to have changed. 
The broadest measure of productivity change is total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth which, under certain conditions' and for 
small changes, is defined as the rate of growth of output minus a 
weighted average of input growth rates, where the weights are the 
share of each input in total cost (Millward and Parker, 1983, pp. 
225-9; Muellbauer, 1986). Labour productivity, of course, is 
easier to calculate than TFP, demanding input data on only one 
factor of production. For the same reason, however, changes in 
labour productivity can present a very misleading picture of an 
organisation's productivity growth. For example, a firm could be 
shedding labour very quickly while producing the same level of output 
with much increased levels of other inputs. The narrower (labour 
productivity) measure would thus show an increase in productivity 
whereas the broader measure might show no improvement in TFP. 
Changes in productivity are usually reported as trends, with 
annual data being averaged over a five- or ten-year period. 
There are several reasons for this. First, when long time periods 
are considered, space considerations often demand the reporting of 
results in a concise form. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
the definition of TFP growth given above assumes that the 
1. In particular, that there are constant returns to scale and that the 
firm faces competitive factor and product markets. Also, that the 
firm is in equilibrium with factors of production being paid the value 
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organisation's employment (of inputs is in equilibrium. If, however, 
there are costs of adjusting input levels (see Gould, 1968 and 
Burgess, 1988, for example), occasions will arise when the 
organisation has a non-optimal employment of factor inputs. 
Consequently, a year-by-year measure of productivity growth will be 
influenced by the effects of short-run changes in the utilisation of 
factors of production. However, by averaging productivity growth over 
a number of years the influence of such short-run changes in the 
utilisation of various factors can be much reduced. Third, in some 
studies, such as this one, much of the data behind the reported 
productivity measures is culled from the organisation's own annual 
accounts. Changes in accounting and reporting practice frequently 
mean that consistent accounts are simply not available. Although the 
data were adjusted wherever possible for significant changes in 
reporting practice, the implication is that while the significance of 
year-to-year productivity changes cannot be vouchsafed, broad trends 
over, say, a four or five year period, are that much more reliable. 
Finally, when interpreting our results we need to remember that 
changes in TPP might reflect changes in the technology available to 
an organisation or changes in the efficiency with which inputs are 
combined in an organisation. Our argument is that status affects 
an organisation's efficiency and thus when comparing rates of TE'P 
growth there is an implicit assumption that no new technology became 
available at about the same time as the change in organisational 
status. To reduce the possibility that the availability of new 
technologies might contaminate our results, we focused on average 
annual growth rates ever a relatively short period of four years, but 
a period long enough to overcome the problems outlined associated :qith 
year-on-year changes in productivity. 
In the results reported below labour productivity (LP) is 
defined as:- 
weighted index of physical quantities of output 
LP = 
volume of labour input 
where the volume of labour input was taken to be the organisation's 
average number of employees throughout the year. There was 
insufficient information on average hours worked to provide a more 
satisfactory denominator. TFP is defined as:- 
weighted index of physical quantities of output 
TFP = 
(total expenditure on inputs/weighted index of input prices) 
A formal statement of the model can be found in Appendix 1. When a 
volume of output figure was not readily available the value of output 
was deflated using an appropriate price index. Usually more than one 
price index was tried as a deflator; in this way we were able to 
examine the sensitivity of our results to the precise price deflator 
used. For all organisations, output and expenditure data were 
extracted from annual reports and accounts and in certain cases 
internal working papers. Input and output price indices were 
derived from a variety of sources which are listed in Appendix 2. 
Table 2 reports the average annual growth in labour .and total 
factor productivity for the four years before and after each 
organisation's status change.2 British Aerospace and London 
Transport provide twc tests of our central hypothesis because 
both firms underwent two changes in organisational status. The 
results are presented for groups of trading funds, public corporations 
and ownership changes. 
(Table 2 Here) 
For HMSO two sets of figures are reported for each productivity 
measure reflecting the use of different price deflators for the value 
of output series. Irrespective of which deflator is used, however, 
both results show an increase in labour productivity growth following 
the movement from government department to trading fund status. Such 
a result is in accordance with our model's predictions. However, the 
TFP growth results present a different picture. In particular, 
whether TFP growth improves or deteriorates after the organisation's 
status change depends upon the precise price index used to deflate the 
value of output series. Using the retail price index for all items 
excluding food yields an improvement in productivity performance in 
the sense that the decline in TFP slows down. However, using an 
appropriately weighted output price index combining paper, printing 
2. In all cases the dates refer to accounting year ends. For example, for 
the HMSO 1977-80 refers to the accounting years year ending 31 March 
1977 to 31 March 1980. 
and publishing with office machinery results in a very slight 
deterioration of performance. Obviously this latter result is likely 
to be the more accurate due to the use of a more appropriate price 
deflator for the value of output series. However, the increased rate 
IIf decline in productivity growth is very small (just 0.1 per cent per 
annum). I r this reason, and the fact that the data behind the result 
are likely to contain some measurement error, we would not want to 
attach too much significance to this result. Both figures suggest, 
however, that the gain in labour productivity following the status 
change was not mirrored in an improvement in TFP. This is also the 
case if later periods are compared to allow for a time lag before the 
status change affected performance. Between 1982 and 1986, for 
example, labour productivity rose by an impressive 12.0 per cent per 
annum, and TFP growth was zero rather than negative. 
Consider next the results for Royal Mint which also became a 
trading fund. Here there is no ambiguity. As our model predicts, the 
average annual growth in both labour productivity and TFP increased 
substantially following this organisation's change of status. For the 
Royal Ordnance Factories, which became a trading fund in July 1974, 
three sets of results are reported for both productivity measures, 
again reflecting the use of different price indices to deflate the 
value of output series. Unfortunately, there is an absence of an 
appropriate price series for munitions. In the event, the precise 
price index used is immaterial as for both labour productivity and TFP 
growth, all three output series move in the same direction following 
the organisation's change of status. Contrary to our hypothesis 
labour productivity growth falls following the change of status from 
about 12.2 per cent to around 2.5 per cent per annum averaging the 
three results. However, TFP growth increases from about 1.6 per cent 
to about 5.5 per cent per annum. This confirms an earlier observation 
that changes in labour productivity may not be reflected in changes in 
TFP. Changes in labour productivity are part of changes in T?: but 
changes in the productivity of other factors may dominate changes in 
labour productivity. 
In the case of the Post Office postal and telecommunications 
businesses, it was expected that productivity would rise with public 
corporation status. In fact, while labour productivity did improve, 
the performance of TFP deteriorated, implying an inefficient use of 
resources. 
For London Transport two measures of the volume of output were 
used . First, the number of passenger miles paid for travel by road 
and rail. However, this measure of output could fall, due to an 
exceptionally cold winter for example, although exactly the same 
services were being offered by London Transport. As an alternative 
measure of output we used the number of passenger place miles 
available for travel by road and rail. 
For both measures of output annual labour productivity growth 
falls following London Transport's status change in January 1970 from 
about 2.5 per cent in the four years prior to the status change to 
between 1.7 and 2.4 per cent in the four years after the status 
change. The movement in TFP growth shows a sharper deterioration. 
Using the narrower measure of output, the number of passenger miles 
paid for travel by road and rail, the average annual growth in TFP 
decreased from 1.6 per cent to -1.9 per cent. Similarly, using 
the broader, and perhaps more appropriate measure of output, TFP 
gro!Jth fell from 1.5 per cent to -2.7 per cent per annum. 
The productivity growth results following London Transport’s 
change of c\,mership in June 1984 were also qualitatively unambiguous, 
no matter which measure of output or productivity was used. Taking 
an aver,age, labour productiYlity growth jumped from 0.8 per cent per 
annum in the four years prior to the status change to 11.6 per cent 
per annum in the four years after. TPP growth also increased but by 
slightly less; from a negative growth of around -2.1 to -0.1 per 
cent to between 3.2 and a very respectable 7.3 per cent per annum. 
Advancing the date of the status change one year to reflect any 
‘anticipation’ effects, produced even more impressive growth figures 
of -4.3 per cent to 13.0 per cent in labour productivity and from 
-6.5 per cent to 8.9 per cent in TFP. Thus, the two changes for London 
Transport involving movements between government department and public 
corporation status produced results consistent with our central 
hypothesis. 
For Rolls-Royce three sets of figures for both labour 
productivity and TFP growth are reported, each reflecting the use 
of a different price index with which to deflate the value of 
output series. The three price indices used were (i) a total 
(labour and materials) input price index for aero-engines and aero- 
engine parts - on the grounds that price might be set as some mark-up 
over cost; (ii) an output price index for the appropriate SIC 
group, mechanical engineering; and (iii) the retail price index 
for all items excluding food. No matter which price index was 
used the qualitative result was the same for both productivity 
growth measures. Taking an average of the three figures the annu.al 
labcur productivity growth increased from around -6.0 per cent to 
about 14.1 per cent; while the change in TFP growth was 
qualitatively similar but of a smaller order of magnitude from about 
-1.6 per cent to 5.2 per cent per annum. These results contradict 
our hypothesis (an east-west movement in Figure 1). The state take- 
over in 1971 was associated with higher productivity, although this 
improvement might reflect the "shock effect" of the company's 
financial collapse. 
The results for British Aerospace's first change of status in 
1977 also support our hypothesis. Again there are three figures for 
both labour productivity and TFP growth, reflecting the use of 
different indices to deflate the firm's value of output. Again the 
results indicate that the precise index used is immaterial. Labour 
productivity growth fell following nationalisation from around 5 to 9 
per cent to around 0 to 2.4 per cent per annum depending upon the 
price deflator used. Similarly, averaging the results, TPP growth 
declined from about 2.2 per cent to about 0.2 per cent per annum. 
Using the same price indices the results for British Aerospace's 
second change of status in 1981 again supported our hypothesis. 
Following privatisation, and averaging, labour productivity growth 
jumped to about 7.2 per cent per annum; while TFP growth increased to 
2.8 per annum. 
The results for the National Freight Consortium appear to 
contradict our central hypothesis. Whereas we would expect 
productivity to have risen on privatisation - especially as the firm 
of privatisation implies a 'long-move' on our west-east spectrum - 
both labour snd total factor productivity growth decreased after 1981. 
In this case, though, the results <are especially sensitive to the year 
chosen as the date of the status change. 
Although privatised in February 1982, denationalisation was 
heralded in the Conservative's 197? Manifesto and the necessary 
legislation received the Royal Assent on 30 June 1980. Taking 1980 as 
the year of status change to reflect 'anticipation effects', as 
management prepared for privatisation, the growth in labour 
productivity in the four years before and after this date is as our 
central hypothesis predicts (the figures are in parentheses in Table 
2). Labour productivity, depending upon which price deflator is used, 
grew from between 0.5 and 2.1 per cent per annum 1977-80 to between 
7.1 per cent and 9.0 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1984. 
Although TFP rose in the same period, the results for this measure are 
less clear cut (figures in parentheses in Table 2) with the growth in 
TFP rising impressively when output is deflated by a transport and 
vehicles prices deflator but not when output is deflated by the non- 
food RPI. The transport and vehicles deflator is probably more 
representative of price movements in road haulage. But in the absence 
of a better output series the precise movement in TE'P in this period 
must remain unclear. 
In so far as public ownership is associated with over-manning, 
we would expect to see labour productivity increase more spectacularly 
than TFP after the announcement of privatisation and this is borne out 
occurred in the mid-1980s, after privatisation. Between the start of 
1983 and the end of 1986 labour productivity in the NFC rose by 
between 6.5 per cent and 8.2 per cent and TFP by between 1.8 per cent 
and 3.4 per cent per annum, depending upon the price deflator used, 
with output based on the transport and vehicles price deflator still 
giving the higher results. 
For British Ainiays figures for both labour productivity and TFP 
growth .x-e reported reflecting two different ways of measuring the 
airline's vclume of output. The first result uses available tonne 
kilometres (ATK). However, a number of factors might influence the 
cost of providing a given number of tonne kilometres. In particular, 
the longer the flight stage length and the larger the aircraft size 
the lower the cost per tonne kilometre. Also, an increase in 
passenger load will not increase the cost per tonne kilometre 
proportionately. Thus a second measure of British Airways' output 
was used to take account of these variables. Lacking data on the 
average size of the aircraft in the British Airways' fleet, we used 
as a measure of output ATK' AEiB PLFY , where A8 is the average 
sector flown and PLF is the passenger load factor. The 
parameters ~1 , 6 and y take the values of 1.0, -0.2 and 0.4 
respectively, reflecting the quantitative effect each variable is 
believed to have on airline unit costs (for a justification of these 
weightings see Forsyth, Hill and Trengove, 1986). 
Irrespective of which measure of output or productivity is used, 
the results for British Airways support our hypothesis of an 
anticipation effect. The average annual growth in labour productivity 
increased from about 6.4 per cent to around 7.9 per cent following 
the announcement that the organisation :las to be privatised. 
Similarly the average growth in TFP increased from about 5.5 per cent 
tc about 6.5 per cent per annum. 
4. Controllinq for other factors 
A potential problem facing our time series study is controlling 
for factors other than the status change which might have affected 
performance. Competition in the product market is a possible factor. 
But as already mentioned, except for British Aerospace in 1977 and 
London Transport and the HMSO in the 198Os, there appear to have been 
no significant changes in the intensity of competition facing our 
organisations around the times of the status changes. It is possible, 
however, that our results reflect more general trends in UK 
productivity. That productivity performance has improved since the 
early 1980s is well chronicled (eg Muellbauer, 1986, McWilliams, 
1989). Moreover, macroeconomic policy can impact upon productivity 
levels. A deflationary policy tends to reduce productivity growth 
initially due to labour hoarding and a time lag in adjusting capital 
stock. 
To reflect national productivity movements the labour 
productivity and TFP figures for each organisation were compared with 
the corresponding estimates for the UK economy, public corporations 
and, in the case of manufacturing businesses, UK manufacturing. The 
results are presented in Table 3. The figures represent the average 
annual percentage difference in the growth rate of each of our 
organisations and the appropriate national productivity indicator in 
the periods before and after the status change. For example, a 
positi-Je figure indicates that the organisation's productivity gr,o!orth 
exceeded the national average. 
(Table 3 Here) 
In the case of + -he HIISO, the rise in labour productilAty after 
1980 appears to reflect a general improvement in labour productivity 
nationally in the period. Indeed, compared with productivity in UK 
manufacturing and public corporations, the HMSO's performance was 
especially disappointing between 1981 and 1984, though it improved 
between 1982 and 1985. In terms of TFP a disappointing performance 
is also confirmed. The decline in TFP contrasts vividly with improved 
performance nationally. In contrast, after allowing for national 
productivity movements, the Royal Mint showed a dramatic improvement 
in both measures of productivity following its status change. 
Turning to the Royal Ordnance Factories where earlier it was 
discovered that labour productivity deteriorated but TFP improved 
with the change to trading fund status, comparison with national data 
suggests a more complex result. The decline in the rate of growth in 
ROF labour productivity after 1974 appears to reflect a worsening UK 
productivity trend. The decline is less evident when compared with 
trends in average productivity in the whole economy, public 
corporations and manufacturing. Similarly, although TFP growth in the 
Royal Ordnance Factories was stronger after 1974 than in the 
immediately preceding years, in relation to TFP growth in the whole 
economy and public corporations performance worsened. Only when 
compared with the very slow growth in UK manufacturing TFP in these 
.pa years does the performance of the Royal Ordnance Factories appear 
to hav:e improved. 
Figures for the Post Office postal and telexmmunicatisns 
businesses present ,a confusing picture. In the postal serYlice 
comparative labox productivity improved after 1969 as our central 
hypothesis predicts, though it still lagged behind growth rates for 
the whole economy and for public corporations. Comparing TFP gro1:nh 
rates, the postal service improved its performance slightly in 
relation tc yblic corporations after 1969 but suffered a worsening of 
performance relative to TFP growth in the whole economy. In 
telecommunications a higher comparative labour productivity growth 
rate was matched by higher TFP growth in relation to other public 
corporations. However, in relation to TFP growth in the whole economy 
the record of Post Office telecommunications was disappointing. The 
growth rate almost matched that of the economy generally in the four 
years before 1969 but lagged behind the national growth rate by an 
average of 1.0 per cent per annum in the four years after 1?69. 
The comparative TFP results for London Transport are also in 
accordance with our central hypothesis. Compared with the national 
indices, performance deteriorated further from 1970 when the GLC 
became responsible for overseeing the corporation, and improved 
sharply after 1984 when greater operating independence was achieved. 
The comparative labour productivity figures suggest some improvement 
after 1970, though only by a slight amount. A sharply improved 
performance is confirmed, however, for the period after 1984. 
The results for Rolls Royce confirm that labour productivity ,and 
TFP improved following the status change after allowing for national 
productivity movements. However, the good performance after 
naticnalisation, particularly for TFP, did not last. From 1975 to 
1978 bcth labour productivity and TFP fell in Rclls Roy?e while 
national productivity continued to rise slowly. The results for 
British Airways and the National Freight Corporation are also in 
accordance with our earlier findings - performance improved after the 
announcement of privatisation. 
The earlier British Aerospace results are mixed. The slight 
improvement in TFP performance in relation to public corporations in 
general and UK manufacturing during the period of nationalisation is a 
feature of the very poor TFP record of public corporations and 
manufacturing industry in these years. Similarly, the sharp recovery 
in UK manufacturing productivity in the early 1980s accounts for the 
deterioration in relative TFP performance after 1981. Basing the 
comparison on comparative labour productivity growth, however, 
nationalisation and privatisation had the predicted consequences. 
5. Conclusion 
Table 4 summarises the results in terms of our initial hypothe- 
sis. In most cases the central hypothesis that a west to east 
movement leads to an improvement in performance was supported by both 
the labour productivity and total factor productivity results. In 
the cases of the HMSO, the Royal Ordnance Factories and the Post 
Office postal and telecommunications businesses, however, the two 
measures produced different conclusions. The transfer of the Royal 
Ordnance Factories from control by a government department to a 
trading fund appears, contrary to our expectations, to have led to a 
slight deterioration in the growth of labour productivity alongside 
some improvement in the total factor productivity trend. Other than 
the lack of an appropriate output series, there is no obvious 
explanation for this and it is noticeable that productivity 
performance in relat-ion to the aggregate productivity indices was 
mixed. In the case of the HMSO the results depend on whether the date 
of status change is taken as 1980 or 19P,2. Changing the date allows 
for a delay between becoming a trading fund and performance improving. 
The idea of time lags, like improvements in performance in the run-up 
to a status change, seems plausible and perhaps likely. 
Turning to the Post Office postal and telecommunications busi- 
nesses, labour productivity appears to have improved but TFP appears 
to have deteriorated with the coming of public corporation status. The 
result was usually supported when productivity growth in the postal 
service was compared with productivity growth in the economy and in 
public corporations in general. In telecommunications the 
deterioration in TE'P growth appears not to have been as large as in 
other public corporations but worsened compared with TFP growth in the 
whole economy. For London Transport relative labour productivity did 
not decline as expected when the service became accountable to the 
GLC. On the other hand, the TFP measure does suggest a deterioration 
in performance in accordance with our central hypothesis. In the case 
of the National Freight Corporation, the results broadly support the 
view that privatisation led to an improvement in productivity. 
In terms of our schema, !!!EiO faced greater ;mpetition for 
orders within government from 1982, or a north-south movement in 
terms of Figure 1. Therefore at least part ,of the imprcvemont in 
performance observed may he the consequence of a change in the 
product market rather than a change in organisational status. 
Similarly, Lcndon Transport faced more competition in the 1980s, 
associated with the Government's policy of liberalising public 
transport. However, given that the management of London Transport 
was briefed to reduce losses and act more commercially when 
accountability to the GLC ended, it is probable that the sharply 
improved performance we have identified was associated with the 
status change. Also, the nationalisation of British Aerospace 
caused an east-west and south-north movement which we predicted 
would produce a major deterioration in performance. This was 
broadly confirmed. Only when the company's TPP performance was 
contrasted with productivity changes in UK manufacturing was 
there some suggestion that our central hypothesis did not hold. 
This, however, reflects the large fluctuations in manufacturing 
productivity between 1975 and 1984 rather than improved performance 
under nationalisation and a deterioration in performance when 
privatised. 
The only case where both productivity series did not confirm our 
central hypothesis was Rolls Royce. The state takeover in 1971 
should, according to our thesis, have led to a poorer performance. 
In fact, both labour productivity and total factor productivity, 
which had been declining in the years immediately prior to 1971, 
of this result. First, nationalisation can lead to greater 
efficiency, contrary to the arguments of public choice and property 
rights theorists. Second, reorganisation leads tc improved 
performance (change is in itself reinvigor.ating). Or third, the state 
takeover resulted from financial failure and following the collapse 
new managerial methods were introduced. Although the first two 
possibilities cannot be entirely ruled-out, the third seems more 
attractive. In the light of our other results, it is difficult to 
accept the view that reorganisation per se is all that is required; 
while the first possibility would be more easy to sustain if the 
improved performance had lasted. In fact, both labour productivity 
and total factor productivity deteriorated significantly in Rolls 
Royce from the mid-1970s. Between 1975 and 1978, for example, TFP 
declined by -2.4 per cent per annum and labour praductivity by -3.7 
per cent. An initial spurt in productivity is, however, reconcilable 
with the view that the financial collapse acted as a short-term 
stimulus to reorganise and cut waste. By the mid-1970s 
nationalisation was having the effect on productivity which our 
central hypothesis forecasts. 
Despite some inconsistencies in our results, a movement west to 
east in Figure 1 appears, on the basis of our sample, to lead to 
improved performance measured in terms of partial and total factor 
productivity. The sample is small, however, and more research is 
necessary covering different periods and organisations. Nevertheless, 
despite the limitations, our results generally support the UK 
Government's programmes for setting-up agencies to some degree at 
industries. The results 21~0 have relevance tc governments in other 
countries pursuing similar policies. It does seem that movements <lest 
to east in our schema, from gol:ernment departmental ,:,?nCr'Jl, to 
agencies, public corporations and the :?rivate sector can bring gains 
in efficiency. Improved performance, however, is not guaranteed. 
APPENDIX 1 
Calculation of total factor productivity 
To investigate the effects of organisational status upon performance, total 
factor productivity gro\,!th was studied using a full equilibrium index 
model. Production was assumed to be characterised by a production function 
of the following form in which all factors of production were assumed to be 
in equilibrium: 
Qt = Atf[Kt, Ltt Mtt Et1 
where Q is output, I( is the stock of physical capital, L is the labour 
input, M is raw material and component inputs, E is energy and subscript t 
refers to the time period. A is a Hicks-neutral measure of technical 
change. 
Assuming for simplicity a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
Qt = At,a I4 N. bi 
i=l It 
where Nit equals Kt, Nzt equals Lt, N3t equals Mt, Nqt equals Et and bi 
equals the output elasticity of factor i. An index of TFP is defined 
as: 
TJ?Pt = Qt/a I4 Nithi 
i=l 
Computing time derivatives of the log of this equation produces 
TFP'/TFP = Q'/Q - I4 
i=l 
bi(N'i/Ni) 
where 
TFP"TFP = d[lOg TFPt]/dt, a'/3 = d[lOg Qt]/dt Ed N'i/Ni = d[lOg Nit]/dt 
The TPP growth index is based upon two standard assumptions. First 
that the output elasticity of the ith input is equal to the share of the 
ith input in the total cost; and that there are constant returns to 
scale, or I4 bi= 1. 
i=l 
The first assumption relates to the first order conditions for factor 
market equilibrium. An alternative approach is to use a partial 
equilibrium model in which capital is assumed to be quasi-fixed (not in 
equilibrium: Diewart, 1981). Hazilla and Kopp (1987) have used both 
approaches to estimate industrial productivity and discovered that the 
corresponding estimates were usually the same (also see Lichtenberg and 
Siegel, 1987, p 655). The assumption of constant returns is important in 
so far as increasing or decreasing returns would increase the likelihood 
that the status change is perceived to have a statistically significant 
effect on the growth of TFP. 
From the above and using the methodology employed by Griliches and 
Lichtenberg (1984) and Molyneaux and Thompson (1987), amongst others, we 
calculated a Tornqvist (1936) index to give a discreet approximation to 
the continuous Divisia index of real input. Thus our formula for TFP 
growth became: 
TFP'/TFP = 
where Qt/Qtml = 
In (Qt'Qt- 1 ) - ~~=l~O.'(Vit+Vi,t-l)I ln(Nit/Ni t-1) I 
“j[Qj,t,/Qj,t-1]4(rjt’rj~t-i) 
lJpt-l = Zi[Vit,Vi,t-114(5it+si, t-1) 
rjt = PjtQjt/ IPjtQjt = revenue share of output Qj 
in total revenue during period t 
V* 1t = quantity of input Vi produced in period t, and 
sit = WitVit/ IWitVit = cost share of input Vi 
in total cost during period t. 
rjhanges in aggregate output and input between any tcwo years were measured 
by using the prices in each year as the relevant weights. This minimises 
bias caused by changes in relative factor prices over the whole period 
studied (Kendrick, 1961). A composite input price index was computed for 
each year reflecting the input weightings and used to obtain the value of 
real inputs. The result is the real cost of producing output (Forsyth, 
Hill and Trengove, 1986 p. 65). 
APPENDIX 2 
This appendix reports on the ,data an r! the precise price indices used tc 
deflate the value of output data (where volume of output data ?lere not 
readily available) and to construct a weighted annual index of prices for 
each organisation. 
13utput in current Es is defined as the value of sales with adjustments for 
stocks and work in progress where relevant. 
Labour input is wages and salaries, pensions and employers' national 
insurance contributions in current Es. No data were available on hours of 
work for our sample of organisations. Use of figures for national and 
industry level hours worked may not be appropriate. Nevertheless, in 
certain cases these figures were used as a cross-check on our results 
reported. The direction of change in TFP and the broad order of magnitude 
of TFP growth were unaffected. 
Capital input was constructed using interest and depreciation charges which 
it is recognised may not accurately reflect economic amortisation of 
capital but was considered to be a broad approximation. Haid and Muller 
(1986) argue that: "In general, economic depreciation is approximated by 
using accounting rates of depreciation." This, however, is controversial. 
With economic amortisation, y, a function of our approximation, x, and s an 
error term, we have assumed that y = [x,s] with s # F[DV] where DV is the 
status change. There is no reason to suppose that this should not be so. 
Other inputs were based upon the categories of costs in current values in 
accounts. In all cases appropriate input price deflators were used. 
Unit labour input costs were calculated as total labour costs divided by 
the average number of individuals employed by the organisation throughout 
the year. The gross domestic fixed capital fcnnation deflator for 
manufacturing industry was used as an index of capital input costs. The 
retail price index for all items excluding food was used to deflate those 
(other) costs which were not specifically identified in the accounts, or 
for which a more appropriate deflator could not be found, or which 
comprised less that 1 per cent of total expenditure. 
Where an organisation's annual accounts referred to a year ending 31 March 
all price indices were appropriately adjusted by linear interpolation. 
All price indices were extracted from various issues of British Business, 
Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics, Monthly Digest of Statistics 
and Transport Statistics Great Britain. Output series are from annual 
accounts and CSO data. 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) 
Output index: value of output deflated by (i) the retail price index for 
all items excluding food and (ii) an appropriately weighted output price 
index combining paper, printing and publishing with office machinery, where 
the weights reflected the share of office machinery in the total value of 
HMSO's sales in 1981-82. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, an input price index for materials 
and fuel purchased by paper, printing and publishing plus other costs 
weighted by the annual share of each input in total expenditure. 
Royal Mint 
Output index: number of coins minted. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, an output price index for metal 
manufacturing (to deflate raw material costs), an output price index for 
mechanical engineering to deflate semi-processed material costs, capital 
input costs, electricity costs per kW therm (to deflate fuel costs) plus 
other costs weighted by the annual share of each input in total 
expenditure. 
Rolls-Royce 
Output index: value of output deflated by three alternative price indices: 
(i) a total input (materials and labour) price index for aero-engines and 
aero-engine parts; (ii) an output price index for mechanical engineering 
and (iii) the retail price index for all items excluding food. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, capital input costs plus an input 
price index for materials purchased by aero-engines and aero-engine parts 
weighted by the annual share of each input in total expenditure. 
British Airways 
Output index: either (i) available tonne kilometres (ATK) which is defined 
as the sum over all of the airline's flight operations of the payload 
capacity of the aircraft multiplied by the distance flown or (ii) the more 
complicated but perhaps more appropriate ATK" AS%LFY where AS is the 
average sector flown and PLF is the passenger load factor. The parameters 
a, B and y take the values of 1.0, -0.2 and 0.4 respectively (see Forsyth 
et al, op tit for a discussion of this approach to this measurement of an 
airline's output). 
Input index: unit labour costs, aviation jet fuel index (to deflate fuel 
costs), capital input costs plus other costs weighted by the .annual share 
of each input in total expenditure. 
Royal Ordnance Factories 
Output index: value of output deflated by either (i) the retail price index 
for all items excluding food, (ii) an output price index for mechanical 
engineering or (iii) an output price index for metal goods. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, an output price index for metal 
manufacturing (to deflate material input costs), capital input costs plus 
other costs weighted by the annual share of each input in total 
expenditure. 
British Aerospace 
Output index: value of output deflated by either (i) the retail price index 
for all items excluding food, (ii) an output price index for mechanical 
engineering or (iii) a total (materials and labour) cost index for inputs 
to the aerospace industry (on the grounds that much of British Aerospace's 
public sector work will be on a cost-plus basis). 
Input price index: unit labour costs, a material and fuel input cost index 
for the aerospace industry, capital costs, plus other costs weighted by the 
annual share of each input in total expenditure. 
London Transport 
Output index: either (i) the number of passenger miles paid for travel by 
road and rail or (ii) the number of place miles available for travel by 
road and rail. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, capital costs, fuel and power <costs 
as measured by an index combining, with equal weights, indices measuring 
the cost per kW therm of electricity and the producer price of derv, 
engineering materials costs measured by the cutput price index for 
mechanical engineering plus other costs weighted by the annual share of 
each input in total expenditure. 
National Freight Corporation 
Output index: value of output, measured as turnover, deflated by two 
alternative price indices: either (i) the retail price index for all items 
excluding food or (ii) the retail price index for transport and vehicles. 
Input price index: unit labour costs, capital input costs plus other costs 
weighted by the annual share of each input in total expenditure. 
Post Office Postal and Telecommunications 
Output index: additional income due to business expansion net of price 
changes divided by previous year’s output. 
Input index: current expenditure less additional expenditure due to pay and 
price levels divided by previous year’s expenditure. 
Total Factor Productivity whole economy 
output: index of GDP at constant factor cost; output 
based measllre (1980=100) 
Input of labour: ::orkforce employed in the economy at mid-year. 
Weighting was based on the share of total income 
going to labour (Lw), with the weight on 
capital 3s l-Lw. The capital input therefore 
reflects all non-labour inputs in value added 
(for a defence of this method, Devine, et al, 
1935, p.307). 
Input of capital: gross capital stock at replacement cost and 
constant prices at mid-year (1980=100). 
Total Factor Productivity UK manufacturing 
output: index of manufacturing in GDP at market 
factor cost; output based measure (1980=100). 
Input of labour: employees in manufacturing as at mid-year weighted 
by the share income for labour in manufacturing 
income (Lmw) ; with the weight on capital as 
1-Lmw. The capital input therefore reflects all 
non-labour inputs in value added. 
Input of capital: gross capital stock in manufacturing at replace- 
ment cost and constant prices at mid-year 
(1980=100). 
Total Factor Productivity public corporations 
output: total sales of public corporations at constant 
prices (1980=100). 
Input of labour: numbers employed in public corporations weighted 
by the share of wages in total income of 
public corporations (Lpw). 
Raw materials and other non-labour and non capital inputs: 
purchases of public corporations deflated by non- 
food RPI and weighted by purchases in total income 
of public corporations (Lpp). 
Capital input: net capital stock at replacement cost and 
constant prices (1980=100). Weighting for 
capital is 1-(Lpw+Lpp). 
Comment on possible error 
Measurement error could arise because the price deflators used for output 
and inputs do not accurately reflect price movements. In constructing our 
TFP indices, however, there is no reason to believe that any measurement 
error is correlated with the dummy variable so biasing our results. 
Moreover, where a reliable "own price" deflator was not available a number 
of deflators were tried and the results compared. Adopting this procedure 
also helps to identify cases where the "own" price deflator reflects not 
only price inflation but changes in the quality of output. There is a 
danger of understating productivity growth if part of any price rise 
removed by deflating relates to quality changes. 
It is assumed that there ,are constant ret'lrns to scale and that the firm 
faces competitive factor and product markets. Also, that the firm is in 
equilibrium with factors of production being paid the value of their 
marginal products. Consequently, factor payments exhaust the firm's total 
revenue. 
In all cases the dates refer to accounting year ends. For example, for the 
HMSO '1977-80' refers to the accounting years 'year ending 31 March 1977 to 
31 March 1980'. 
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Table 1: Orqanisational Status Chancres 
Type of change 
1. Government department 
to trading fund 
2. Government department 
to public corporation 
3. Public corporation 
to (local) 
department' 
government 
Organisation 
Royal Ordnance 
Factories 
Royal Mint 
HMSO 
Post Office 
Postal 
Post Office 
Telecommuni- 
cations 
London 
Transport 
4. Local government 
department to 
public corporation 
London 
Transport 
Date Change in Prediction from 
product central hypothesis 
market of change in 
productivity 
July 1974 No Improvement 
April 1975 No Improvement 
April 1980 Yes Improvement 
April 1969 No Improvement 
April 1969 No Improvement 
Jan 1970 No Deterioration 
June 1984 Yes Improvement 
5. Change of ownership:- 
(a) Public limited 
company to ublic 
corporation s 
Rolls Royce 
British 
Aerospace 
Feb 1971 
April 1977 
No 
Yes 
Deterioration 
Deterioration 
(b) Public corporation 
to public limited 
company 
British Feb 19813 
Aerospace 
National Freight Feb 19824 
No 
No 
Improvement 
Improvement 
(c) Anticipation effects: British Airways 1980-19875 No 
public corporation 
Improvement 
to public limited 
company 
Notes for Table 1 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
London Transport strictly remained a public corporation 
throughout. From 1970 to 1985, however, it was responsible to the 
Greater London Council and was subjected to more frequent and 
extensive political interference, especially in pricing policy. 
Therefore for our purposes the change in status in 1971 is treated as 
if it were a movement fr5m public corporation to government department 
status. 
Rolls Royce was not nationalised in a formal sense; its shares 
fell into government ownership following financial collapse. For 
our purposes, however, this transfer is treated as a movement from PLC 
to public corporation status. 
In February 1981 51.6% of the shares in British Aerospace were sold 
by the government. The remainder were sold in May 1985. At the 
time of the first sale the Government undertook not to interfere in 
the running of the company. 1981 can therefore be treated as the 
date of privatisation despite the Government's continued 
shareholding. 
National Freight was a manager and worker buy-out of a public 
corporation supported by the banks. It therefore represents the 
"longest" movement west to east of any firm in our sample. We 
would therefore anticipate major efficiency gains. 
British Airways was not privatised until January 1987 but is included 
to test for "anticipation effects" since its privatisation was 
announced by government as early as 1980 but delayed by a recession 
in air transport and legal difficulties following the collapse of 
Laker Airways. 
Table 2: Averaqe Annual Growth in Productivity 
Average annual growth in 
Year of productivity (06) 
status change Notes Before change After change 
LP TFP LP TFP 
Organisation 
1. Trading funds 
HMSO 1980 
1975 
1974 
1 0.4 -1.9 2.6 -1.5 
2 1.7 -0.6 3.2 -0.7 
Royal Mint 
Royal Ordnance 
Factories 
3 -5.6 -4.5 8.8 6.1 
1 13.6 2.9 4.4 7.5 
4 11.8 1.3 1.6 4.6 
5 11.1 0.5 1.6 4.4 
2. Public corporations 
Post Office Postal 1969 
Post Office 
Telecommunications 1969 
London Transport 1970 
6 -1.1 -1.3 1.3 -2.3 
6 5.0 2.7 11.3 1.5 
7 2.5 1.6 2.4 -1.9 
8 2.4 1.5 1.7 -2.7 
London Transport 1984 7 0.0 -2.1 14.0 7.3 
8 1.6 -0.1 9.2 3.2 
3. Ownership chanqes 
Rolls Royce 1971 1 -5.9 -1.5 16.5 7.5 
9 -7.4 -3.0 12.4 3.3 
4 -4.9 -0.4 13.6 4.7 
British Aerospace 1977 1 9.0 4.4 1.6 0.6 
4 6.3 1.8 2.4 1.3 
10 4.8 0.4 0.0 -1.2 
British Aerospace 1981 1 1.6 0.6 6.9 2.5 
4 2.4 1.3 7.8 3.3 
10 0.0 -1.2 7.0 2.5 
National Freight 
Consortium 1982 1 
,",::) 
11 
,:::, 
(5:;) 
,E) 
-0.9 
(Z) (1.3) 
,E, (03::) 
12 6.2 5.6 7.8 6.5 
13 6.5 5.4 8.0 6.4 
British Airways 1980 
I 
Notes for Table 2 
1. 
3 -* 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Using the retail price index for all items excluding food to deflate 
the value of output, 
Using an appropriately weighted output price index combining paper, 
printing and publishing with office machinery. 
@utput is number of coins minted. 
Using an output price index for mechanical engineering to deflate 
the value of output. 
Using an output price index for metal goods nes to deflate the value 
of output. 
Using Post Office figures of additional income due to business 
expansion net of price changes. 
Using passenger miles paid for travel by road and rail as the volume 
of output. 
Using passenger place miles available for travel by road and rail as 
the volume of output. 
Using a total input price index for aero-engines and aero-engine 
parts to deflate the value of output. 
10. Using a total cost index for inputs into the aerospace industry to 
deflate the value of output. 
11. Using the retail price index for transport and vehicles to deflate 
the value of output as measured by turnover. 
12. Using available tonne kilometres as the volume of output. 
13. Using an augmented measure of available tonne kilometres (see text 
for details) as the volume of output. 
Table 3: Controlling for National Productivity Changes 
Organisation 
Whole Economy Public UK 
Corporations Manufacturing 
LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Trsdinq funds 
HMSO 
1977-80 0.5 -2.4 -1.3 -0.8 1.1 2.5 
1981-84 0.2 -5.0 -3.3 -1.0 -2.8 -9.4 
1982-85 7.1 -3.5 3.8 -3.2 4.1 -7.7 
Royal Mint 
1972-75 
1976-79 
Royal.Ordnance 
Factories 
1971-74 
1975-78 
Public corporations 
Post Office Postal 
1966-69 
1970-73 
Post Office 
Telecommunications 
1966-69 
1970-73 
London Transport 
1966-69 
1970-73 
1980-83 
1984-87 
-6.3 -3.6 -8.5 -6.9 -8.1 -7.0 
6.2 1.7 2.3 4.2 6.6 5.7 
9.6 2.5 0.9 1.8 7.6 -1.2 
6.3 1.2 3.4 1.3 6.6 4.5 
-4.0 -4.4 -8.1 -5.6 
-1.5 -4.8 -0.4 -3.6 
2.2 -0.4 -2.0 -1.6 
8.6 -1.0 9.7 0.2 
-0.6 -1.5 -3.8 -2.7 
-0.1 -4.4 -1.3 -3.2 
-0.5 -4.9 -5.7 -3.8 
7.2 4.8 R * 
n.a n.a 
n.a n.a 
n.a n.a 
continued over . . . . 
Ownership chanqes 
Rolls Royce 
1967-70 
1971-74 
1975-78 
British Aerospace 
1973-76 
1977-80 
1981-84 
National Freight 
Consortium 
1977-80 
1980-83 
1983-86 
British Airways 
1978-79 
1980-83 
1981-84 
-10.4 -5.6 -13.6 -6.9 -11.1 -6.0 
-4.8 2.5 9.9 1.8 -4.5 -1.2 
-4.8 -5.9 -7.9 -5.8 -4.5 -2.6 
4.0 0.1 -0.9 -3.2 2.4 -2.0 
-1.2 -3.0 -4.0 -1.3 0.1 1.9 
4.0 -1.8 0.5 2.2 0.9 -6.2 
-0.7 -0.6 -3.5 1.0 
5.0 0.3 -0.2 1.4 
5.0 0.4 o*32 1.2 
3.7 1.0 -0.3 3.5 
5.7 3.6 0.5 4.7 
5.3 1.1 1.8 5.1 
n.a n.a 
n.a n.a 
Notes for Table 3 
* Privatisation distorts figures in this period, therefore results not 
reported. 
1. Figures based upon output deflated by each organisation's nearest (3~x1 
price deflator or a physical output series where available. 
2. 1983-85 only. 
3. Figures show difference in percentage points between an organisation's 
average annual productivity growth and the corresponding national 
average figure (Organisation - UK). LP = average annual growth in 
labour productivity (05); TFP = average annual growth in total factor 
productivity (OS). 
Table 4: Sumary of rwlts 
Pesults 
kganisatm 
Royal Kint 
Royal ‘3rdoance 
Factories 
Post 3ffice 
Postal 
Post Office 
Telecoaauni- 
Tatioss 
Lcndoc Transport 
(local government 
control) 
London Transport 
(public 
corporation) 
Rolls Royce 
British Aerospace 
jnationa!isation) 
British Aerospace 
(privatisati9) 
Sational Wight 
Sritisb Airways 
Predi:ti::. 3f 
cec:n! hypothesis 
Illprnl70d 
performance 
Improved 
performance 
Improved 
perfarnance 
Improved 
perfxmmce 
Improved 
performance 
Deterioration 
is performance 
Iqroved 
performance 
Deterioration 
in perfonance 
Deterioration 
in performance 
Iaproved 
performance 
improved 
performance 
Improved 
performance 
Labour 
produzivity 
Ccnfimed 
Ccnfirmed 
Not Confined 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confined 
Confirmed 
Not ccnfined 
Confined 
Confined 
Confined 
Confined 
Tota! f3ct3r 
productivity 
Kixed result 
Confiraed 
Confirmed 
Not confined 
Not ccnfirmed 
!!onfined 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Cocfined 
Confined 
nixed result 
Confined 
lsbaur 
productivity 
coupared with 
national trends 
Kixcd result 
Confined 
Not confined 
Confined 
Confirmed 
N3t confirmed 
Confined 
Not confirmed 
Confined 
Confined 
Confirmed 
Confined 
Tota! Psctor 
productivity 
::qared with 
national trends 
NC: :cnfmed 
Confirmed 
Hired result 
Hixed result 
Hixed result 
Confirmed 
Confined 
Not confirmed’ 
Kixed result 
Nixed result 
Confirmed 
Confined 
* Cements refer to four years after the status change. 
